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Following U.S. Supreme Court Review, Ninth Circuit Remands EEOC Subpoena Case

Posted in Investigation Tactics and Administrative Subpoenas

 

100px-US-CourtOfAppeals-9thCircuit-Seal_svgBy Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Christopher J. DeGroff and Alex W. Karasik

Seyfarth Synopsis: After the U.S. Supreme Court clarified in McLane Co. v. EEOC, No. 15-1248, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 2327 (U.S. 2017), that the scope of review for employers facing EEOC administrative subpoenas was the abuse-of-discretion standard, a relatively high bar of review, the Ninth Circuit applied that standard of review on remand and vacated the District Court’s original decision that denied the enforcement of an EEOC subpoena.

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An often contentious issue in EEOC investigations involves the scope of administrative subpoenas, which can be burdensome for employers when the subpoenas seek a broad range of company-wide information.  When analyzing the standard of review for decisions relating to the enforcement of EEOC subpoenas, in McLane Co. v. EEOC, No. 15-1248, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 2327 (U.S. Apr. 3, 2017), the U.S. Supreme Court held that such decisions were examined under an abuse-of-discretion standard.  The abuse-of-discretion standard sets a relatively high bar for review, as we blogged about here.  Following the U.S. Supreme Court’s remand to the Ninth Circuit in McLane, the Ninth Circuit vacated the District Court’s denial of enforcement of the subpoena and sent the matter back to the District Court for further proceedings.  EEOC v. McLane Co., No. 13-15126, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 9027 (9th Cir. May 24, 2017).

For employers, this is an important case to follow as it provides clarification as to the standard of review used when Appellate Courts address district court subpoena enforcement decisions.

Background

The EEOC issued an administrative subpoena as part of its investigation into a charge of discrimination filed by a former employee of a McLane subsidiary.  Id. at *3.  The employee alleged that McLane discriminated against her on the basis of sex when it fired her after she failed to pass a physical capability strength test.  Relevant here, the subpoena requested “pedigree information” (name, Social Security number, last known address, and telephone number) for employees or prospective employees who took the test.  Following the Court’s precedent at the time, the Ninth Circuit applied a de novo review to the District Court’s ruling that the pedigree information was not relevant to the EEOC’s investigation.  Id. at *3-4.  The U.S. Supreme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit’s judgment after holding that a district court’s decision whether to enforce an EEOC subpoena should be reviewed for abuse of discretion.  The U.S. Supreme Court remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit so that the Ninth Circuit could re-evaluate the District Court’s ruling under the proper standard of review.

 The Ninth Circuit’s Decision On Remand

After reviewing the District Court’s decision under the abuse-of-discretion standard, the Ninth Circuit still held that the District Court abused its discretion by denying enforcement of the subpoena.  Id. at *4.  The District Court found that the pedigree information was not relevant “at this stage” of the EEOC’s investigation because the evidence McLane had already produced would “enable the [EEOC] to determine whether the [strength test] systematically discriminates on the basis of gender.”  Id.  The Ninth Circuit rejected this approach, noting that the District Court’s ruling was based on the wrong standard for relevance.  The Ninth Circuit stated that under Title VII, the EEOC may obtain evidence if it relates to unlawful employment practices and is relevant to the charge under investigation.  Quoting EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 68-69 (1984), the Ninth Circuit opined that the relevance standard encompasses “virtually any material that might cast light on the allegations against the employer.”  Id. at *5.

Applying Shell Oil, the Ninth Circuit found that the pedigree information was relevant to the EEOC’s investigation since conversations with other McLane employees and applicants who have taken the strength test “might cast light” on the allegations against McLane.  Id.  McLane argued that, given all of the other information it had produced, the EEOC could not show that the production of nationwide pedigree information was relevant to the Charge or its investigation under either a disparate treatment or disparate impact theory.  Id. at *6. The Ninth Circuit construed the District Court’s application of relevance to be a heightened “necessity” standard, and noted that the governing standard was “relevance,” not “necessity.”  Id.

The Ninth Circuit then found that the District Court erred when it held that pedigree information was irrelevant “at this stage” of the investigation.  Id.  Rejecting the District Court’s conclusion that the EEOC did not need pedigree information to make a preliminary determination as to whether use of the strength test resulted in systemic discrimination, the Ninth Circuit held that the EEOC’s need for the evidence—or lack thereof—did not factor into the relevance determination.  Id. at *6-7. While McLane had argued that the pedigree information was not relevant because the charge alleged only a “neutrally applied” strength test, which by definition cannot give rise to disparate treatment, systemic or otherwise, the Ninth Circuit rejected this approach, holding “[t]he very purpose of the EEOC’s investigation is to determine whether the test is being neutrally applied; the EEOC does not have to take McLane’s word for it on that score.”  Id. at *7.  Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit held that because the District Court based its ruling on an incorrect view of relevance, it necessarily abused its discretion when it held that the pedigree information was not relevant to the EEOC’s investigation.

The Ninth Circuit concluded by noting that on remand, McLane was free to renew its argument that the EEOC’s request for pedigree information was unduly burdensome.  Id. at *8. Further, explaining that it did not reach the issue in its original decision, the Ninth Circuit instructed that “[o]n remand, the district court should also resolve whether producing a second category of evidence — the reasons test takers were terminated — would be unduly burdensome to McLane.”  Id.  Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit vacated the District Court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings.

Implications For Employers

As employers who are confronted with EEOC subpoenas may ultimately find themselves in a subpoena enforcement action, the McLane case is a must-follow in terms of what standard of review will be applied if those district court decisions are later reviewed.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s adoption of the more “hands off” abuse-of-discretion standard means that greater weight will be given to district court decisions.  Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit’s ruling here illustrates that appellate courts may still be willing to overturn district court decisions to enforce or quash EEOC subpoenas depending on the circumstances.  The decision will also, no doubt, be cited by an emboldened EEOC as authority for its position that expansive pedigree information is relevant in a broad swath of cases.  Understanding these trends will provide useful guidance for employers when deciding if and how to challenge what often can be burdensome demands for information from the EEOC.

Readers can also find this post on our Workplace Class Action blog here.

Dueling Fifth Circuit Panel Deadlocks, No Rehearing For Bass Pro In “Big Fish” EEOC Case

Posted in EEOC Litigation

bassBy Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Christopher J. DeGroff, and Alex W. Karasik

Seyfarth Synopsis: After a Fifth Circuit decision affirming a ruling by a U.S. District Court in Texas allowed the EEOC to seek compensatory and punitive damages in its high-profile Title VII pattern or practice race discrimination lawsuit against Bass Pro, a deadlocked Fifth Circuit denied Bass Pro’s petition for a rehearing en banc.  The highly contentious dissenting opinion, which prompted a response from the panel in favor of denying the rehearing, is a must-read for employers regarding judicial views on the damages the EEOC can seek in Title VII pattern or practice of discrimination litigation.

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One of the EEOC’s largest pending nationwide lawsuits, a Title VII pattern or practice race discrimination case concerning retailer Bass Pro’s hiring practices, has resurfaced in an appeal.  In EEOC v. Bass Pro Outdoor World LLC, No. 15-20078, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 7628 (5th Cir. Apr. 28, 2017), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was tasked with deciding whether to grant Bass Pro’s petition for a rehearing en banc after it previously affirmed a decision of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas allowing the EEOC to seek compensatory and punitive damages by bringing claims under § 706 and 707 of Title VII.  Evident in a pair of pull-no-punches opinions, the Fifth Circuit panel of judges was deadlocked in a 7-7 split on whether to grant the rehearing, thus resulting in Bass Pro’s petition being denied.

As employers continue to challenge the EEOC’s willingness to stretch the bounds of pattern or practice Title VII litigation, the highly contentious dissenting opinion (“Dissent”), and equally provocative response from the panel in favor of denying the rehearing (“Panel”), are must-reads for employers.

Case Background

As we have discussed in previous blog posts (here, here and here), the EEOC brought a lawsuit alleging discriminatory hiring practices in violation of Title VII on behalf of a group of individuals allegedly discriminated against on the basis of their gender or race, both as a representative action (under § 706) and based on a pattern or practice theory (under § 707).  The Dissent noted that the 50,000 allegedly aggrieved individuals, Black and Hispanic applicants, was a number “asserted [by the EEOC] in shotgun fashion, with no development or refinement of who or where the individuals are.”  Id. at *4.  Further, the Dissent explained that “[t]he EEOC, after a three-year investigation, could identify zero discriminatees or even potential discriminatees. Upon being pressed by the [D]istrict [C]ourt, the EEOC identified about 100, and later, about 200, of the 50,000 mass.”  Ultimately, the District Court allowed the EEOC to pursue pattern or practice claims on behalf of the 50,000 claimants under § 706, seeking individualized compensatory and punitive damages.  On June 17, 2016, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision.  Bass Pro thereafter filed an interlocutory appeal.  Id. at *5.

The Fifth Circuit’s Decision

As a result of a 7-7 split between the circuit judges, the Fifth Circuit denied Bass Pro’s petition for a rehearing en banc.  The Dissent initially summarized its argument by matter-of-factly noting “this ‘pattern or practice’ case cannot be brought under § 706 or § 707 as to provide individualized compensatory and punitive damages for a mass of 50,000 persons.”  Id. at *6.  In support of this assertion, the Dissent argued that the plain language and legislative history of the Title VII forbids § 706 “pattern or practice” suits, and the Panel’s contrary holding rendered § 707 of the Act a meaningless appendage to Title VII and hence superfluous.  Second, the Dissent argued that allowing pattern or practice suits for individualized compensatory and punitive damages poses insurmountable manageability concerns, which the Supreme Court has addressed before and rejected such suits.  Finally, the Dissent opined that allowing pattern or practice suits for individualized compensatory and punitive damages for the 50,000 allegedly aggrieved individuals necessarily ran afoul of the Seventh Amendment.

After the Dissent pointedly advocated this array of arguments, the Panel countered with a 16 page response, asserting that Bass Pro ignored “the independent role of the EEOC when it sues on behalf of the United States government . . . [and] asks us to hold as a matter of law that damages authorized by the 1991 amendments to the Civil Rights Act can only be recovered in individual suits.”  Id. at *20-21.  After clarifying the role of the EEOC in light of the 1991 amendments of the Civil Right Act of 1964, the Panel opined that, “Bass Pro’s argument rests upon a fundamental premise: that the EEOC’s enforcement authority and choice of remedies is tethered to the individuals for whose benefit it seeks relief. That premise is false.”  Id. at *23.  The Panel then argued that because the EEOC brought suit under both § 706 and 707, Bass Pro’s argument that the Commission was not entitled to punitive damages failed because it “would be truly perverse to withhold the remedy of punitive damages from the EEOC when it targets discrimination in its most virulent and damaging form: polices intentionally calculated to exclude protected minorities and perpetrated on a large scale.”  Id. at *35.

Finally, the Panel addressed Bass Pro’s argument that even if Congress did grant the EEOC the authority to seek compensatory and punitive damages via the pattern-or-practice model, this grant of authority was unconstitutional.  Noting that Bass Pro’s argument appeared to implicate due process concerns under the Seventh Amendment, the Panel held that Bass Pro’s reliance on Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011), was misplaced as that case involved Rule 23 class actions, which  have “no force” in EEOC litigation.  Id. at *36.  After providing a hypothetical analysis as to how a jury may award various types of damages, the Panel concluded by finding Bass Pro’s manageability concerns to be unfounded, and its “claim that this suit cannot be tried is not a statement of fact but an advocate’s prayer.  Seeking to limit its exposure to liability, Bass Pro asks us to shut down this lawsuit before it even gets off the ground.”  Id. at *41-42.

Not to be outdone, the Dissent threw the final punch in a two paragraph dissent to the Panel’s response.  In an effort to clarify the procedural uniqueness of the Panel’s response to the dissenting opinion, the Dissent noted “[l]est there be any mistake, the [P]anel’s ‘response’ must not be confused with a binding opinion on the denial of an en banc petition, because no authority authorizes any such opinion.”  Id. at *42.  As such, the Dissent concluded by instructing that in no way should the Panel’s response be treated as precedential.

Implications For Employers

The Fifth Circuit’s ruling is certainly unfavorable for employers, as this gives the EEOC ammunition to seek a broad range of damages under § 706 and 707, and essentially pick and choose which section’s procedures it wants to follow at various stages of the litigation.  But when reading the tea leaves within the tenaciously written opinions by the divided panel, employers can find encouragement in that many judges – both in the Fifth Circuit and throughout the country – support the Dissent’s belief that the EEOC conflated its rights under § 706 and 707.  As such, employers should continue to follow this case and similar large-scale EEOC pattern or practice cases, which will likely continue to percolate following this government-friendly ruling.

Readers can also find this post on our Workplace Class Action blog here.

Denial Of Defenses: Illinois Court OK’s EEOC’s Pre-Suit Procedures

Posted in Motions for Summary Judgment

gavel on white backgroundBy Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Christopher J. DeGroff, and Alex W. Karasik

Seyfarth Synopsis:  A federal district court in Illinois recently granted the EEOC’s motion for partial summary judgment in EEOC v. Dolgencorp, LLC, No. 13-CV-4307 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 10, 2017), relative to two defenses advanced by an employer, including: (1) the EEOC’s claims were barred as beyond the scope of the charges of discrimination and investigation; and (2) the EEOC failed to satisfy its Title VII pre-suit duty to conciliate with the employer. The ruling should be required reading for any employer facing or engaged in litigation with the Commission.

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An increasingly common issue in EEOC litigation against employers involves the scope of the Commission’s lawsuits as related to the charges of discrimination, as well as the EEOC’s conciliation efforts, or lack thereof.  In EEOC v. Dolgencorp, LLC, No. 13-CV-4307 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 10, 2017), the EEOC moved for partial summary judgment regarding two defenses enumerated by the defendant, Dolgencorp, LLC (“Dollar General”): (1) the EEOC’s claims were barred as beyond the scope of the charges of discrimination and investigation; and (2) the EEOC failed to satisfy its Title VII pre-suit duty to conciliate with the employer.  On April 10, 2017, Judge Andrea R. Wood of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted the EEOC’s motion for partial summary judgment as to these defenses asserted by Dollar General.

As Judge Wood acknowledged, many courts across the country have embraced defenses asserted by employers relating to the sufficiency of the EEOC’s investigation.  However, this ruling demonstrates that not all courts may be as receptive to those arguments.

Case Background

Two former Dollar General employees filed charges of discrimination with the EEOC regarding Dollar General’s allegedly discriminatory use of criminal background checks in hiring and firing determinations.  Id. at 1.  The EEOC investigated and determined that there was reasonable cause to believe that Dollar General had engaged in employment discrimination on the basis of race. The parties then engaged in written and oral communications regarding the alleged discrimination, which did not result in a conciliation agreement acceptable to the EEOC.  Id. at 2.  Thereafter, the EEOC brought a lawsuit against Dollar General under Title VII.

Amongst its enumerated defenses, Dollar General asserted that the EEOC’s claims were barred as beyond the scope of the charges of discrimination and investigation (its 7th enumerated defense), and that the EEOC failed to satisfy the statutory precondition for bringing suit when it failed to conciliate with Dollar General (its 8th enumerated defense). The EEOC moved for partial summary judgment as to Dollar General’s two enumerated defenses.  Id. at 3. The EEOC contended that, on the undisputed facts, these two defenses failed as a matter of law.

The Court’s Decision

The Court granted the EEOC’s motion for partial summary judgment regarding Dollar General’s two enumerated defenses.  Dollar General’s seventh enumerated defense relied upon two separate propositions: first, the EEOC’s claims were barred because they went beyond the claims delineated in the charges of discrimination that generated the EEOC’s lawsuit; and second, the EEOC’s claims were barred because the EEOC failed to investigate those claims adequately prior to bringing suit.  Id. at 4.  The Court rejected the first proposition, holding that when the EEOC files suit, it is not confined to claims typified by those of the charging party, and further, that any violations that the EEOC ascertains in the course of a reasonable investigation of the charging party’s complaint are actionable.  Id.  As to the second proposition, the Court similarly opined that the Seventh Circuit has held that if courts may not limit a suit by the EEOC to claims made in the administrative charge, they likewise cannot limit the suit to claims that are found to be supported by the evidence obtained in the Commission’s investigation.  Id.  Accordingly, the Court rejected Dollar General’s defenses insofar as it sought to dismiss the EEOC’s claims because they went beyond the charges of discrimination or because they were not subject to an adequate pre-suit investigation.  Id. at 4-5.

In addition, the Court addressed Dollar General’s eighth enumerated defense, which contended that the suit could not go forward because the EEOC did not satisfy its pre-suit statutory obligation to conciliate.  The EEOC sent two Letters of Determination to Dollar General that stated that the EEOC found reasonable cause to believe that Dollar General engaged in discrimination in violation of Title VII because, through application of its background check policy, a class of African-American applicants and employees were not hired, not considered for employment, or discharged.  Dollar General argued that this notice of the charge was not specific enough because it failed to identify the persons allegedly harmed and to identify the allegedly discriminatory practice.

Rejecting Dollar General’s argument regarding the specificity of notice, the Court held that the EEOC’s letters clearly set forth that there were African-American applicants and employees who were harmed by the allegedly discriminatory practice.  Id. at 6.  Further, the Court opined that as the Seventh Circuit has explained, the sufficiency of the EEOC’s investigation was not a matter for the judiciary to second-guess.  Dollar General also argued that the EEOC failed to specifically describe the allegedly discriminatory practice, and that merely pointing to the background check policy was not sufficient.  The Court rejected this argument, holding that the EEOC’s notice was sufficient since it identified the two complainants and further put Dollar General on notice that the EEOC’s allegations related to African-American applicants and employees that were not hired, not considered for employment, or discharged due to failing a background check.  Id. at 8-9.

Finally, Dollar General contended that the EEOC’s conciliation discussions were inadequate because the EEOC did not provide Dollar General with an opportunity to remedy the allegedly discriminatory practice.  Id. at 9.  Citing Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC, 135 S. Ct. 1645, 1655-56 (2015) (which we analyzed here), the Court refused to examine the sufficiency of the EEOC’s investigation, noting it was beyond the scope of its review.  Id.  The Court thus rejected Dollar General’s argument that the EEOC did not adequately engage the employer in conciliation discussions.

Accordingly, the Court granted the EEOC motion for partial summary judgment on Dollar General’s seventh and eighth enumerated defenses.

Implications For Employers

While the Court did not find in the employer’s favor, other courts have routinely held the EEOC accountable in instances where it did not fulfill its pre-suit obligations.  With rulings such as this one, it can be expected that the EEOC will continue to test courts’ willingness to force the Commission to abide by its statutory duties under Title VII.  As such, employers should continue to be aggressive in attacking instances where the EEOC improperly expands its lawsuits beyond charges or fails to conciliate.

Readers can also find this post on our Workplace Class Action blog here.

U.S. Supreme Court Holds That An Abuse-Of-Discretion Standard Applies To Review Of EEOC Subpoenas

Posted in Investigation Tactics and Administrative Subpoenas

supreme court seal

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Christopher J. DeGroff, and Matt Gagnon

Seyfarth Synopsis: Yesterday the U.S. Supreme Court handed down its long-awaited decision in McLane Co. v. EEOC, No. 15-1248, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 2327 (U.S. 2017), a decision that clarifies the scope of review for employers facing EEOC administrative subpoenas. The Supreme Court held that such decisions are reviewable under the abuse-of-discretion standard, which is a relatively high bar of review. At the same time, the Supreme Court’s ruling clarifies that EEOC subpoenas are subject to a searching, fact-intensive review that does not lend itself to a “one size fits all” approach.

Background

This case arose out of a Title VII charge brought by a woman who worked as a “cigarette selector,” a physically demanding job, requiring employees to lift, pack, and move large bins of products. After the charging party returned from three months of maternity leave, she was required to undergo a physical capabilities evaluation that was required for all new employees and employees returning from leave or otherwise away from the physically demanding aspects of their job for more than 30 days, regardless of reason. The charging party was allowed three times to meet the level required for her position, but failed each time.  McLane then terminated her employment.

The charging party claimed that her termination was because of her gender, and further alleged disability discrimination. During the investigation of her EEOC charge, the Commission requested, among other things, a list of employees who were requested to take the physical evaluation. Although McLane provided a list that included each employee’s gender, role at the company, evaluation score, and the reason each employee had been asked to take the evaluation, the company refused to provide “pedigree information,” relative to names, social security numbers, last known addresses, and telephone numbers of employees on that list. In the process of negotiating the scope of information that would be provided, the EEOC learned that McLane used its physical evaluation on a nationwide basis. The EEOC therefore expanded the scope of its investigation to be nationwide in scope, and also filed its own charge alleging age discrimination.

The District Court refused to order the production of pedigree information, holding that it was not “relevant” to the charge at issue because that information (or even interviews of the employees on the list provided by McLane) could not shed light on whether an evaluation represented a tool of discrimination. EEOC v. McLane Company, Inc., No. 12-CV-02469 (D. Ariz. Nov. 19, 2012) (See our blog post of the District Court’s decision here.)

On October 27, 2015, the U.S. Court of Appeal for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the District Court’s decision de novo and held that the District Court had erred in finding the pedigree information irrelevant to the EEOC’s investigation. EEOC v. McLane Company, Inc., Case No. 13-15126, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 187702 (9th Cir. Oct. 27, 2015). (See our blog post of the Ninth Circuit’s decision here.)

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the disagreement among the courts of appeals regarding the appropriate scope of review on appeal. The posture of the appeal was somewhat unusual because, after the grant of certiorari, the EEOC and McLane both agreed that the District Court’s decision should be reviewed for abuse of discretion, although the EEOC argued that the Ninth Circuit’s decision should stand as a matter of law. The Supreme Court therefore appointed an amicus curiae to defend the Ninth Circuit’s use of de novo review.

The Supreme Court’s Decision

The Supreme Court began its analysis by noting that in the absence of explicit statutory command, the proper scope of appellate review is based on two factors: (1) the history of appellate practice; and (2) whether one judicial actor is better positioned than another to decide the issue in question.

Regarding the first factor, the Supreme Court noted that abuse-of-discretion review was the longstanding practice of the courts of appeals when reviewing a decision to enforce or quash an administrative subpoena. In particular, the Supreme Court noted that Title VII had conferred on the EEOC the same subpoena authority that the National Labor Relations Act had conferred on the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”), and decisions of district court to enforce or quash an NLRB subpoena were reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Regarding the second factor, the Supreme Court held that the decision to enforce or quash an EEOC subpoena is case-specific, and one that does not depend on a neat set of legal rules. Rather, a district court addressing such issues must apply broad standards to “multifarious, fleeting, special, narrow facts that utterly resist generalization.” McLane Co. v. EEOC, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 2327, at *14 (U.S. 2017) (quoting Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U. S. 552, 561-62 (1988)). In particular, in order to determine whether evidence is relevant, the district court has to evaluate the relationship between the particular materials sought and the particular matter under investigation. These types of fact-intensive considerations are more appropriately done by the district courts rather than the courts of appeals.

The Amicus argued that the district court’s primary role is to test the legal sufficiency of the subpoena, which does not require the exercise of discretion. The Supreme Court held that this view of the abuse-of-discretion standard was too narrow. The abuse-of-discretion standard is not only applicable where a decision-maker has a broad range of choices as to what to decide, but also extends to situations where it is appropriate to give a district court’s decision an unusual amount of insulation from appellate revision for functional reasons. Those functional considerations weighed in favor of the abuse-of-discretion standard rather than a de novo standard of review. Because the Ninth Circuit did not apply that standard on appeal, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit for further proceedings.

Implications For Employers

The McLane case is important for employers because it clarifies the standard of review that is applied to the review of district court decisions enforcing or quashing EEOC subpoenas. Although the Supreme Court adopted the more “hands off” abuse-of-discretion standard, thus giving even more weight to the district court’s judgment, it did so because it identified the fact-intensive nature of these judgment calls, including important decisions about how difficult it would be for the employer to produce the requested information weighed against the need for that information, and the relationship between the particular materials sought and the particular matter under investigation.

At the very least, this language shows that the EEOC does not get to automatically presume relevance of its administrative subpoenas at the outset, as the EEOC sometimes likes to argue. Rather, employers should be able to cite to language in the Supreme Court’s opinion to reinforce the fact that the district court must give serious consideration to issues of relevancy and burden (also whether the subpoena is “too indefinite” or for an “illegitimate purpose”) when deciding whether to enforce an EEOC subpoena.

Readers can also find this post on our Workplace Class Action blog here.

Tennessee Court Rejects EEOC’s Supersized Subpoena Served On Fast Food Employer

Posted in Investigation Tactics and Administrative Subpoenas

gavel on white backgroundBy Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Mark W. Wallin, and Alex W. Karasik

Seyfarth Synopsis: A federal court in Tennessee denied the EEOC’s application for an Order to Show Cause why its administrative subpoena should not be enforced.  This ruling highlights the importance and benefits of employers understanding the contours of the charges being investigated by the EEOC, so that the employer can guard against improper fishing expeditions.

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Although courts typically grant the EEOC wide latitude to obtain information regarding its investigations of workplace discrimination, this access is not limitless.  One such limit was recently highlighted in EEOC. v. Southeast Food Services Company, LLC d/b/a Wendy’s, Case No. 3:16-MC-46 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 27, 2017 ), where Magistrate Judge H. Bruce Guyton of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee denied the EEOC’s Application for an Order to Show Cause Why an Administrative Subpoena Should Not Be Enforced (“Application”).  The Court refused to enforce the EEOC’s subpoena, finding that the request for contact information of all of Southeast Food Services Company, LLC, d/b/a Wendy’s (“Wendy’s”) current and former employees, among other things, was not relevant to the individual charge of discrimination being investigated by the EEOC.

This ruling illustrates the importance to employers of understanding the scope of the EEOC charge being investigated, and provides a roadmap for pushing back against agency overreach when the Commission seeks information that is not pertinent to the investigation at issue.

Case Background

In September 2014, Wendy’s hired Christine Cordero as a crew member at one of its restaurant locations.  Id. at 2.  Shortly thereafter, Wendy’s promoted Cordero to crew leader.  Id.  As part of her promotion, Wendy’s requested that Cordero sign a general release of all claims she may have against Wendy’s up to that point, but not including future claims.  Id.  For the past 20 years, Wendy’s had conditioned promotions on signing this release. Id.  Despite not having any claims against Wendy’s, Cordero refused to sign the release.  Id.  As a result of her refusal, Cordero did not receive the promotion, but still received training for the position and a small raise that accompanied the promotion.   Id.

Ms. Cordero continued to work for Wendy’s, but filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC in December 2014.  Id.  In the charge, Cordero alleged that Wendy’s retaliated against her by not promoting her due to her refusal to sign the release. Id.  In the course of its investigation of Cordero’s charge of discrimination, the EEOC learned of Wendy’s longtime practice of requiring employees to sign a release of claims as a condition of promotion, and thereafter sent Wendy’s a letter indicating it intended to expand the investigation.  Id.  In this letter, the EEOC also requested information from Wendy’s regarding current and former employees who had worked for Wendy’s since December 2012.  Id.  Wendy’s, however, refused to provide this additional information, and the EEOC then issued a subpoena seeking the same information.  Id. at 2-3.

The EEOC’s subpoena sought the identity and contact information of all current and former employees since December 2012, including employees who signed the release of claims and who had been promoted.  Id. at 3.  In addition, the subpoena sought the employees’ dates of hire, promotion and termination, reasons for termination, and titles, as well as copies of all releases that Wendy’s had employees sign during that period, among other things.  Id.  Wendy’s continued to object, and refused to provide the information subpoenaed.  Id.  Thereafter, on November 18, 2016, the EEOC filed the Application with the Court, to which Wendy’s responded on February 22, 2017.

The Court’s Decision

The Court denied the EEOC’s Application and declined to enforce the subpoena.  The EEOC argued that it “require[d] the contact information for [Wendy’s] employees to mail questionnaires in order to determine if those employees gave up any claim in order to receive promotions.”  Id. at 4.  In response, Wendy’s asserted that the sole issue with regard to the instant charge was whether its uniform policy regarding a signed release as a condition of promotion was sufficient to sustain Cordero’s Title VII retaliation claim, and that the information sought for the questionnaires was neither relevant nor necessary to the EEOC’s investigation.  Id. at 4-5.  Siding with Wendy’s, the Court rejected the EEOC’s argument, finding that “whether other ‘employees gave up any claim in order to receive promotions’ [was] irrelevant to resolving Ms. Cordero’s charge.”  Id. at 5.

The EEOC further argued that sending the questionnaires to other employees was the only way to verify Wendy’s contention that no other employees aside from Cordero refused to sign the release.  The Court again rejected the EEOC’s argument, noting it was “unclear how another employee’s refusal to sign a release ‘might cast light’ on the instant charge, particularly where there is no dispute that for the past 20 years, all employees have been required to sign a general release of all claims as a condition of promotion.”  Id. at 6.  The Court further reasoned that the potential unlawfulness of Wendy’s employment practice was not dependent on how many other employees signed a release.  Id. at 7.  Accordingly, the Court held that the EEOC did not meet its burden in demonstrating that the information subpoenaed is relevant to Cordero’s charge, and declined to enforce the subpoena.

Implication for Employers

In what has become “go-to” play in the EEOC’s investigation playbook, the Commission has been aggressive in taking individual charges of discrimination as means to seek company-wide personnel information from employers through subpoenas.  Employers that encounter requests for expansive personnel data in the course of single employee investigations can add this ruling to their own playbooks in defending against overzealous EEOC investigations.  While the Commission likely will continue to be aggressive in seeking massive amounts of information from employers in investigations, this ruling provides optimism for employers who are willing to firmly oppose such tactics.

Readers can also find this post on our Workplace Class Action blog here.

Keys To Successor Liability: EEOC Discrimination Suit In Alabama

Posted in EEOC Litigation

200px-NDAla_sealSeyfarth Synopsis: An Alabama district court granted a temporary staffing company’s motion to dismiss all claims in one of the EEOC’s most high-profile lawsuits asserting hiring discrimination and abuse of vulnerable workers. The ruling illustrates the procedural defenses that employers possess to ensure that pre-lawsuit investigations undertaken by the EEOC accord with its obligations under the law.

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A recent mission of the EEOC has been to aggressively pursue lawsuits on behalf of “vulnerable workers” who may not always be aware of their rights. A result of the EEOC’s recent aggressiveness is that the Commission often neglects to fulfill its pre-suit obligations under Title VII and overlooks jurisdictional requirements when racing to the courthouse. These tactics came under scrutiny in EEOC v. Labor Solutions of Alabama, Inc. f/k/a East Coast Labor Solutions, No. 16-CV-1848 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 17, 2017), where Judge Virginia Emerson Hopkins of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama granted Labor Solutions of Alabama, Inc.’s (“LSA”) motion to dismiss the EEOC’s complaint. The Court found that the EEOC lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and failed to exhaust its administrative remedies after suing LSA for alleged conduct that occurred by its supposed predecessor before LSA was ever formed.

This ruling is a signal victory for employers involved in EEOC litigation regarding potential successor liability, as well as any employer involved in EEOC litigation where the Commission fails to exhaust its pre-suit duties under Title VII.

Case Background

The EEOC investigated charges of discrimination against a company called East Coast Labor Solutions, LLC (“East Coast”), alleging that East Coast discriminated against the charging parties on the basis of their national origin and failed to accommodate their disabilities. Following its investigation, the EEOC issued East Coast a letter of determination finding reasonable cause to believe that Title VII and the ADA were violated with respect to the charging parties and a class of current and former employees. Id. at 8.  The EEOC thereafter unsuccessfully attempted to conciliate with East Coast.  In November 2013, East Coast ceased operations.  LSA was formed in October 2014.

Despite the fact that LSA was not in existence when the alleged misconduct occurred, the EEOC filed a Complaint alleging that LSA subjected the Claimants to discriminatory treatment based on their national origin and failed to accommodate their disabilities. While East Coast partnered with its owner Labor Solutions (a different entity than LSA), the only Defendant named in the lawsuit was LSA.  Thereafter, LSA moved to dismiss the Complaint because it failed to allege that LSA employed the Claimants, thereby meaning the Complaint should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim under Title VII and the ADA. Id. at 9.  LSA also argued that the EEOC failed to exhaust administrative prerequisites, noting that LSA was not named in the original EEOC charge or in any amendment thereto.

The Courts Decision

The Court granted LSA’s motion to dismiss. First, the Court addressed the EEOC’s argument that it alleged plausible facts to infer so-called “successor liability.” Id. at 11.  After thoroughly examining various Eleventh Circuit precedents regarding successor liability, the Court explained that “[a]lthough the Court agrees with the EEOC that successorship does not have to be conclusively determined at this stage of the litigation, that does not absolve the agency from pleading facts which make its existence plausible.” Id. at 26.

Applied here, the Court determined there were “no facts suggesting substantial (or even any) continuity in business operations from East Coast to LSA. The Complaint contains no allegations that there was any sale of East Coast, or any of its assets, to LSA.”  Id. at 27.  Finding there was no successor liability, the Court further reasoned that East Coast had been defunct nearly an entire year before LSA was formed; there was no allegation that LSA employed substantially the same work force and/or supervisors as East Coast; the Complaint did not allege that LSA operated at the same location as East Coast; there was no allegation as to whether East Coast could have provided relief before or after any alleged sale or transfer; and there was no allegation as to whether LSA could provide any relief now.

The Court further rejected the EEOC’s argument that East Coast and LSA were both temporary staffing agencies and that both entities shared the same managing officers, principal office address, and company email accounts, holding this was not enough to demonstrate continuity when one considered the break in time between when East Coast ceased operations and LSA began. Finally, the Court opined that even if the Complaint had plausibly alleged that LSA was the successor to East Coast, it would still be dismissed since it was undisputed that LSA was not named in the original EEOC charge, or in any subsequent amendment.  Accordingly, the Court granted LSA’s motion to dismiss, but noted the EEOC may file an amended complaint to attempt to cure its deficiencies.

Implications For Employers

For employers with intricate corporate structures and ties to defunct entities, this ruling is a major victory. Employers with corporate officers who previously worked at a similar but defunct entity can use this ruling to as a roadmap to navigate EEOC lawsuits concerning allegations from before their business was ever formed. In sum, this is yet another example of a court pumping the brakes on procedurally improper EEOC litigation.

Readers can also find this on our Workplace Class Action Blog here.

No Subpoena For You! – Tenth Circuit Says EEOC’s Subpoena Out Of Line

Posted in Investigation Tactics and Administrative Subpoenas

subpoenaBy Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Christopher DeGroff, and Alex W. Karasik

Seyfarth Synopsis: The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit recently held that a district court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to enforce a far-reaching EEOC administrative subpoena relating to one employee’s charge of disability and pregnancy discrimination. The case is important for all employers involved in EEOC investigations.

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Employers facing EEOC litigation are often confronted with requests for information and subpoenas that ask for a substantial amount of personnel information, even if the investigation concerns a single employee’s charge of discrimination.  After the EEOC sought to enforce an administrative subpoena requesting information about a large number of employees of TriCore Reference Laboratories (“TriCore”) over a period of several years, the U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico declined to enforce subpoena.  Following the EEOC’s appeal – in EEOC v. TriCore Reference Labs., No. 16-2053 (10th Cir. Feb. 27, 2017) – the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling, finding the subpoena was overly broad and not relevant to the EEOC’s investigation of a single employee’s charge of discrimination. In the immortal words from the Jerry Seinfeld show, the Tenth Circuit said — “no subpoena for you!”

In anticipation of the U.S. Supreme Court’s upcoming decision in EEOC v. McLane Co., Inc., No. 15-1248 (2017), which will likely determine the standard of review for appellate courts considering district court decisions to either quash or enforce EEOC subpoenas (as we blogged about here), this ruling is an excellent victory for employers facing overly broad EEOC subpoenas.  Further, this ruling deals a blow to the EEOC’s aggressive strategy of using far-reaching subpoenas in investigations.

Case Background

In 2011, Kellie Guadiana began working at the Albuquerque, New Mexico location of TriCore as a phlebotomist.  Id. at 4.  In November 2011, Guadiana requested accommodations to her work schedule and responsibilities due to her rheumatoid arthritis, which she asserted was exacerbated by her pregnancy.  After reviewing the doctors’ notes that Guadiana submitted in support of her requests, TriCore determined that she could not safely perform the essential functions of her position. TriCore offered Guadiana the opportunity to apply to other positions within the company for which she was qualified and whose essential functions she could perform.  On May 5, 2012, after Guadiana did not apply to a new position, TriCore terminated her employment.  One month later, Guadiana filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC alleging that TriCore had discriminated against her due to her disability (rheumatoid arthritis) and sex (pregnancy).  Id. at 5.  In response, TriCore said it provided Guadiana a reasonable accommodation by offering her the chance to apply for other positions.

Based on evidence uncovered during the EEOC’s investigation of the underlying charge, the EEOC informed TriCore that the scope of its investigation was expanded to include a “[f]ailure to accommodate persons with disabilities and/or failure to accommodate women with disabilities (due to pregnancy).”  Id. at 6.  As part of its expanded investigation, the EEOC sent TriCore a letter requesting: (1) a complete list of TriCore employees who had requested an accommodation for disability, along with their personal identifying information; and (2) a complete list of TriCore employees who had been pregnant while employed at TriCore, including the employees’ personal identifying information and whether they sought or were granted any accommodations. The EEOC sought that information for a four-year time frame.  TriCore refused to comply, contending the EEOC did not have an actionable claim of discrimination.  On February 23, 2015, the EEOC submitted another letter seeking the same information but limited to a three-year time frame.  After TriCore again refused to comply, the EEOC subpoenaed the information it had sought in its letter.  TriCore petitioned the EEOC to revoke the subpoena, arguing it was unduly burdensome and a “fishing expedition.”  Id. at 7.  The EEOC denied TriCore’s petition.

After TriCore refused to comply with the EEOC’s subpoena, the EEOC submitted an application to the district court requesting an order to show cause why the subpoena should not be enforced.  TriCore responded by arguing the information requested was not relevant to Guadiana’s charge.  The district court viewed the question as a “close call,” but ultimately denied the EEOC’s application, noting that the “EEOC’s real intent in requesting this [information was], in fact, difficult to pin down.”   Id. at 8.  The district court noted that to the extent the subpoena sought evidence to show TriCore had a pattern or practice of discrimination, Tenth Circuit case law did not support such a request.  Further, to the extent the subpoena sought evidence to compare Guadiana with other TriCore employees, the pregnancy request would not provide evidence of relevant comparators.  The EEOC appealed the denial of its application to enforce the subpoena.

The Decision

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the EEOC’s application to enforce its subpoena.  As an initial matter, the Tenth Circuit explained that to show subpoenaed information is relevant, the EEOC must show that it has a realistic expectation that the information requested will advance its investigation, and must further establish the link between its investigatory power and the charges of discrimination. On appeal, the EEOC argued that the district court erred in not enforcing: (1) the disability request, which was relevant to investigate whether TriCore had a policy of discrimination (i.e., pattern-or-practice evidence), and (2) the pregnancy request, which was relevant to investigate whether TriCore treated Guadiana less favorably than similarly situated employees (i.e., comparator evidence).  Id. at 9.

First, the Tenth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the EEOC had not satisfied its burden to justify its expanded investigation, noting “[t]he EEOC has not alleged anything to suggest a pattern or practice of discrimination beyond TriCore’s failure to reassign Ms. Guadiana.”  Id. at 15.  Second, the EEOC argued that the district court erred in denying the comparator-evidence pregnancy request.  The Tenth Circuit initially noted that the EEOC limited its comparator-evidence argument exclusively to the pregnancy request.  While the Tenth Circuit disagreed with the district court and found that the pregnancy request may uncover information that is potentially relevant to Guadiana’s charge, it nonetheless held that the EEOC did not present these relevance arguments in district court and therefore failed to meet its burden of explaining how the pregnancy request would offer information relevant to Guadiana’s charge.  Finally, the Tenth Circuit noted that even if the EEOC provided such an explanation regarding relevancy, its request was nonetheless overbroad because it sought information having no apparent connection to Guadiana’s charge, such as information about pregnant employees who never sought an accommodation.  Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the EEOC’s request to enforce the subpoena.

Implications For Employers

For employers, responding to requests for information and subpoenas in EEOC litigation can be time-consuming and expensive.  Employers confronted with EEOC subpoenas that request a disproportionate amount of personnel information in relation to a single employee’s charge of discrimination can use this ruling to support arguments that such overly broad subpoenas should not be enforced.  Nonetheless, with the issue percolating before the U.S. Supreme Court, employers will continue to have to fight EEOC subpoenas at the investigation stage until the Supreme Court provides further clarity regarding the scope of this often abusive tactic.

Readers can also find this post on our Workplace Class Action blog here.

No Means No – Judge Limits The EEOC’s Claims In Bass Pro Case (Again)

Posted in EEOC Litigation

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Seyfarth Synopsis: In the high-profile EEOC race discrimination litigation against Bass Pro, the Court denied the EEOC’s motion for a ruling that would have allowed it to include in its § 706 claims those individuals who had not yet applied to work for Bass Pro when the mandatory Title VII conciliation process took place.

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The latest chapter of the EEOC’s race discrimination case against Bass Pro (which we blogged about here and here) involves yet another attempt by the government to cast a broad net and increase the number of claimants in its lawsuit.  This week, in EEOC v. Bass Pro Outdoor World, LLC, et al., Case No. 11-CV-3425 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 3, 2017), Judge Keith P. Ellison of the U.S. District Court for Southern District of Texas denied the EEOC’s motion for a ruling that would have allowed it to include claims in its lawsuit for individuals who had not yet applied to work for Bass Pro at the time conciliation took place, which is a mandatory pre-suit duty under Title VII.

For employers confronted with EEOC litigation, this ruling is positive in that shows how courts may be unwilling to allow to the EEOC to add claimants with whom it never conciliated.

Case Background

The EEOC brought a lawsuit alleging discriminatory hiring practices in violation of Title VII on behalf of a group of individuals allegedly discriminated against on the basis of their gender or race, both as a representative action (under § 706) and based on a pattern or practice theory (under § 707).  On March 4, 2014, the Court issued several rulings (which we blogged about here) regarding whether the EEOC had satisfied Title VII’s pre-suit requirements.  Id. at 1.  At the outset, the Court ruled that it must undertake a distinct analyses of the EEOC’s § 706 and § 707 claims on the issue of conciliation.  Accordingly, the Court held that while the EEOC had satisfied Title VII’s conciliation requirements with regards to its § 707 claims, it failed to do so with its § 706 claims.  The Court thus ordered a stay as the remedy for the EEOC’s failure to properly conciliate the § 706 claims.  Id. at 1-2.  Further, the Court dismissed from the case all individuals who had not yet applied to work for Bass Pro by April 26, 2010, the date on which the EEOC issued its Letter of Determination (hereinafter “post-LOD applicants”).  The Court reasoned that the EEOC could not have possibly conciliated the claims of these individuals as they had not yet applied to work for Bass Pro at the time the conciliation took place.

On July 30, 2014, in reversing an earlier ruling, the Court held (as we blogged about here) that the EEOC may prove its § 706 claims using the framework established in Franks v. Bowman Transportation Company, Inc., 424 U.S. 747 (1976), and later refined in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).  Id. at 2.  The Court further held that the EEOC had satisfied its Title VII administrative prerequisites (including its duties to investigate and conciliate) with regards to its § 706 claims, even for individuals not specifically identified in the investigation.  After this ruling was affirmed by the Fifth Circuit, the EEOC argued that the post-LOD applicants must be restored to eligibility in the § 706 class.

The Decision

The Court denied the EEOC’s motion for a ruling that the post-LOD applicants were eligible to participate with respect to the EEOC’s § 706 claims.  The EEOC claimed that Court’s dismissal of the post-LOD applicants was fundamentally tied to two rulings that were subsequently overturned: (1) that the § 706 and § 707 claims must be analyzed separately on the issue of conciliation, and (2) that the Franks/Teamsters model could not be applied to § 706 claims.  The Court rejected this argument, noting that when it dismissed the post-LOD applicants, it made no reference to those arguments and instead focused on the proper sequence of EEOC enforcement under Title VII.  Id. at 3.  Referencing its March 4, 2014 order, the Court explained that because by definition the post-LOD applicants applied after the EEOC’s investigation was completed, the EEOC could not possibly have conciliated their claims.  Accordingly, the Court opined that its reversal on the issues of separate conciliation and the application of the Franks/Teamsters model had no effect on the dismissal of the post-LOD applicants.  Thus, the Court denied the EEOC’s motion and held that the post-LOD applicants remained ineligible for the § 706 claims.

Implications For Employers

For employers facing EEOC litigation, any ruling that limits the size of the case is no doubt favorable in terms of minimizing potential financial exposure.  While employers should be encouraged by this Court’s willingness to hold the EEOC to its obligation to conciliate, there are several recent cases that argue that the courts’ review of the EEOC’s Title VII pre-suit duties remains limited.  Ideally, this ruling will send the EEOC a message that it must abide by the conciliation process or risk losing its ability to bring suit on behalf of claimants with whom it did not conciliate.

Readers can also find this post on our Workplace Class Action blog here.

2016’s Top 5 Most Intriguing Developments In EEOC-Initiated Litigation (And A Preview Of Our Annual EEOC Litigation Report)

Posted in EEOC Litigation

2017 EEOC Book Cover Design (3)

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Christopher J. DeGroff, and Matthew J. Gagnon

We are once again pleased to offer our loyal readers our annual analysis of the five most intriguing developments in EEOC litigation in 2016, along with a pre-publication preview of our annual report on developments and trends in EEOC-initiated litigation. That book, titled EEOC-Initiated Litigation: FY 2016, is a thorough analysis of the lawsuits that were filed by the EEOC in FY 2016 (spanning October 2015 through September 2016), and the major decisions impacting EEOC litigation.

We have analyzed those filings and decisions to provide our loyal readers with a comprehensive examination of trends affecting EEOC litigation. Every employer wants to avoid becoming a target of a government lawsuit. We believe the best way to do that is to develop a clear understanding of the EEOC’s enforcement agenda, litigation activities, and priorities. Our annual report is intended to give corporate counsel, HR professionals, and other decision-makers the tools they need to keep their companies out of the line of fire.

This year’s report once again analyzes enforcement trends impacting employers in the retail, hospitality, manufacturing, healthcare, national resources/construction, and business services industries. That analysis can be found here.

We have also organized the substantive developments according to the EEOC’s strategic priorities. FY 2016 was the last year of the EEOC’s 2012 Strategic Enforcement Plan (SEP). Now is a perfect time to look back and take stock of what the EEOC has actually done with respect to each of those priorities over the past four years.  We think our readers will benefit from understanding how the EEOC interpreted and advanced those priorities over the past four years, especially since the new SEP (covering FY 2017-2021) identifies the exact same priorities.

The full publication will be offered for download as an eBook. To order a copy, please click here.

We always like to end our year with a look back at some of the most interesting decisions and developments of the year. Here is our list of the “top five” most intriguing developments of 2016:

FY 2017-2021 Strategic Enforcement Plan

In FY 2016, the EEOC created and announced a new SEP for fiscal years 2017 through 2021. The new SEP establishes the enforcement priorities that will guide its enforcement efforts over the next four years. Our readers can read all about it here.  We closely monitored how the EEOC adjusted its tactics and enforcement agenda in light of its previous SEP and found that it was a reliable guide to how the EEOC pursues its enforcement agenda. The same will probably be true of the new SEP as well.

The new SEP identifies the same six priorities as the earlier SEP. However, it added two substantive areas of focus regarding what it sees as developing and emerging issues in the workplace. Those include “complex” employment relationships, such as temporary workers, staffing agencies, independent contractor relationships, and those that arise in the on-demand economy. The EEOC also identified “backlash discrimination” against Muslims, Sikhs, and other persons of Arab, Middle Eastern, or South Asian descent. Employers that operate within any of the “complex” employment relationships identified by the EEOC, or who employ sizable populations of Muslim or Middle Eastern workers, should take heed.

Continuing Impact Of Mach Mining v. EEOC, 135 S. Ct. 1645 (2015).

In Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC, the Supreme Court unanimously held that the EEOC’s statutorily-required conciliation activities are subject to judicial review. At the same time, however, the Court outlined a very narrow scope of that review. The Court then left it to the lower courts to harmonize those two aspects of its ruling. Despite some initial victories for employers, courts deciding cases in FY 2016 have tended to find that the EEOC had met its obligation, even when the evidence amounted to little more than the EEOC’s say-so and was contradicted by the employer. The die is not cast just yet, but if this trend continues, it may become much more difficult for employers to contest the EEOC’s “take it or leave it” approach to the conciliation process. Our analysis of this trend can be found here.

Continued Focus On LGBT Discrimination

The EEOC has expended considerable effort advocating for the protection of LGBT rights under the existing anti-discrimination laws. In 2012, it decided – in its own administrative decision – that transgender discrimination is a form of sex discrimination because it is tantamount to discrimination on the basis of a perceived failure to adhere to gender stereotypes. Over the next few years it successfully used that decision to obtain favorable precedent in the federal courts. The EEOC is now using the same tactics to try to establish that Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. On July 15, 2015, the EEOC issued another administrative opinion, which held that Title VII extends to claims of sexual orientation discrimination. It then filed two lawsuits in FY 2016 that allege sexual orientation discrimination, one of which survived a motion to dismiss. Employers should expect that these LGBT issues will remain a centerpiece of the EEOC’s enforcement agenda under the new SEP. Our discussion of these developments can be found here.

New EEO-1 Reporting Requirements

The EEO-1 Report requires employers with more than 100 employees (and federal contractors or subcontractors with more than 50 employees) to collect and provide to the EEOC certain demographic information in each of ten job categories. On February 1, 2016, the EEOC proposed changes to the EEO-1 report, which would require employers to submit employee compensation data by gender, race, and ethnicity. Unless implementation is delayed or stopped, employers will have to start filing these new reports on March 31, 2018. Many employers expect and fear that the EEOC will use this new data to bring more lawsuits under the EPA and Title VII alleging wage discrimination. We discuss these new regulations here.

Political Changes

The most significant political development that will shape the EEOC’s agenda in the coming years is the election of Trump as the next president of the United States. For at least the first two years of Trump’s administration, he will have a Republican majority in both houses of Congress. The EEOC has increasingly relied on large, high-impact “systemic” cases to push forward its strategic goals. These types of cases can have a big impact because they tend to affect a larger number of employees and employers. But those tactics have also been roundly criticized by Republican members of Congress and are a likely target for reform under the new Republican leadership. At minimum, the new administration will bring significant changes to the high-level leadership at the EEOC. That alone will have a significant impact on the EEOC’s strategic direction. Our predictions regarding these changes can be found here.

FY 2016 is shaping up to be a fulcrum year in terms of the EEOC’s enforcement agenda. Not only does it mark the end of the FY 2013-2016 SEP and the beginning of a new SEP, but also it brings with it the uncertainty of an entirely new political climate and a change-over in the party occupying the White House. In that kind of environment, the only thing that is certain is change itself. We do not know exactly what to expect, but we look forward to reporting on those changes as they happen.

We wish all a happy and safe New Year!

Readers can also find this post on our Workplace Class Action blog here.

Bullseye On Big Business: EEOC’s 2016 Performance And Accountability Report Shows Target On Systemic Litigation

Posted in EEOC Litigation

th870JF4SQBy Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Christopher DeGroff, Matthew Gagnon, and Alex W. Karasik

Seyfarth Synopsis: The EEOC recently released its annual Performance and Accountability Report for the fiscal year 2016, a must-read for employers regarding statistical data on EEOC litigation. Continuing a trend from recent years, the EEOC has reaffirmed its commitment to targeting companies in high-profile systemic litigation, albeit with uninspiring results.

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On November 16, 2016, the EEOC released its annual 2016 Performance and Accountability Report (“PAR”) (the Report is here). The PAR highlights the progress of the EEOC’s continued efforts to meet the performance goals that are articulated in its 2012 Strategic Enforcement Plan (“SEP”), including its systemic litigation initiative. As the saying goes, the numbers speak volumes.

The PAR functions as a statistical “scorecard” for the EEOC. It provides a report on its activities during the past fiscal year, from October 1, 2015 through September 30, 2016, including its progress toward meeting the goals outlined in the SEP. While the PAR typically provides a preview of what we can expect to see from the EEOC in the upcoming months, this year’s edition notably avoids speculating as to the future of the EEOC under a new President.

The EEOC’s Overall Results

The EEOC reports that it increased the number of charges resolved to 97,443 charges, up 6.5% from the 91,503 last year. In FY 2014 and FY 2015, the EEOC received 88,778 and 89,385 charges respectively, so the number of charges filed is up slightly over past years.

One of the major goals the EEOC identified in its 2012 SEP was to increase its efforts to champion bigger, more media-focused “systemic” cases, including pattern or practice cases where the alleged discrimination “has a broad impact on an industry, occupation, business, or geographic area.” In the SEP, the EEOC set forth a goal to ensure that systemic cases make up at least 20% of its annual litigation docket and at least 22% to 24% of its litigation docket by 2016. (Read more here.)  In FY 2016, the EEOC asserts it “meets or exceeded” five of the seven measures outlined in the SEP, while it “partially met” the other two.

The EEOC noted that it filed 18 systemic lawsuits in FY 2016, which represents a slight increase from 17 in 2014 and 16 in 2015.  Nevertheless, the number of pending systemic cases declined slightly, with 47 cases on its litigation docket (versus 54 in FY 2013, 57 in  FY 2014, and 48 in  FY 2015). Finally, the EEOC reports it recovered approximately $38 million in relief for victims of systemic discrimination (down from $40 million in FY 2015, but up from $13 million in FY 2014).

Charges: Breezin’ Through The Backlog

The EEOC reduced the charge workload by 3.8% to 73,508, a 3,100 charge reduction compared with FY 2015.  As of the end of FY 2015, the EEOC had a backlog of 76,408 charges, which was an increase of 750 charges over the backlog at the conclusion of FY 2014. The EEOC also noted that it responded to over 585,000 calls to its toll-free number and more than 160,000 inquiries to field offices.

The EEOC resolved over 15,800 discrimination charges through the agency’s administrative processes – comprised of settlements, mediations, and conciliations. This included 273 resolutions of systemic investigations, obtaining more than $20.3 million in remedies. The agency’s mediation program achieved a success rate of over 76%. Regarding conciliation, the EEOC notes that its success rate has remained at 44% over the past two fiscal years.

Settlements: Slowing Down

The EEOC secured more than $482.1 million in total relief in FY 2016. For victims of discrimination in private, state and local government, and federal workplaces, the EEOC obtained $347.9 million through mediation, conciliation, and settlements, again a slight decrease from the $356.6 million it collected in FY 2015 (but an increase from the $296.1 million that it collected in FY 2014). Litigation recoveries also decreased, as the EEOC recovered $65.3 million in FY 2015 while recovering only $52.2 million in 2016.

Lawsuits: Less Litigation

The number of lawsuits filed by the EEOC took a sharp decline, dropping from 142 merits lawsuits (including 100 individual suits, and 42 suits involving discriminatory policies or multiple victims) in FY 2015 to only 86 lawsuits in FY 2016 (including 58 individual suits and 29 suits involving multiple victims or discriminatory policies). Further, at the end of the fiscal year, the EEOC had 165 cases on its active docket. At the end of FY 2015, the EEOC had 218 cases on its active district court docket. This data illustrates how the EEOC has refocused its agenda to put its eggs into ever larger baskets.

Systemic Investigations

The number of systemic investigations completed by the EEOC remained the same. In FY 2016, EEOC field offices resolved 273 systemic investigations and obtained over $20.5 million in remedies in those resolutions (with 71 of the FY 2016 resolutions resulting from successful conciliations). In addition, the agency issued reasonable cause determinations finding discrimination in 113 systemic investigations. By comparison, in FY 2015, the agency reported that it completed 268 systemic investigations; issued 109 cause findings; and resolved 70 systemic investigations by voluntary conciliation agreements, obtaining over $33.5 million in remedies as a result of its systemic initiative.

Accordingly, although the EEOC completed roughly the same number of systemic investigations in FY 2015 and FY 2016 and issued a similar number of reasonable cause determinations in those years, FY 2016 collected a substantially lower amount of money as a result of these larger pattern and practice cases.

Implications For Employers

While the numbers confirm our predictions from 2015 (here) and 2014 (here) that the EEOC would continue its pursuit of high-profile systemic litigation, whether that agenda has been a success is an open question. For example, the EEOC’s financial recoveries have not markedly increased. If and how the EEOC adjusts its tactics to adapt to the incoming Trump administration remains to be seen. If that administration moves in a more employer-friendly direction, or restricts the EEOC’s funding, that could cause the EEOC to rethink its priorities and  its approach to its enforcement program.

Readers can also find this post on our Workplace Class Action blog here.